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Abstract 
 
Most countries engage in a wide variety of export promotion activities that provide 
domestic firms with significant support in the hopes of increasing trade volumes. The 
aim of this thesis is to examine one type of official Swedish export promotion, namely 
state visits. I investigate the potential effect of state visits, performed by Sweden’s 
head of state King Carl XVI Gustaf, on Swedish aggregate merchandise exports. This 
is done by estimating a gravity model fixed effects panel data specification of 
Swedish exports for the period 1973 to 2006. I find no evidence, in my analysis, of 
state visits having any effect on Swedish aggregate exports, suggesting that state visits 
may not be a particularly useful export promotion activity.   
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Gravity Model  
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1. Introduction 
 
Most countries engage in a variety of official export promotion activities that aim to 
assist domestic firms in navigating the international arena and through doing so 
increase trade volumes, increase the number of firms that export, increase the number 
of bilateral trade partners and diversify exports in terms of products and markets 
(Segura-Caylen et al., 2008, p. 9). The underlying theoretical motivation behind 
engaging in various forms of official export promotion is the existence of market 
failures; official export promotion activities would be redundant in a world without 
frictions as, in such a world, there would be nothing stopping firms from exporting 
whenever and to wherever it would be profitable. The notion that imperfect 
information about opportunities and profitability (a market failure) limits the export 
activities domestic firms engage in is thus the most common justification for why 
countries should engage in official export promotion activities. (ibid.).    
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate one facet of Swedish export promotion – 
state visits. State visits are the highest form of diplomatic contact between two 
countries and involve a formal visit by a head of state to foreign country, at the 
invitation of that country’s own head of state. Generally speaking, state visits are 
meant to build good relations between the countries in question. They may also occur 
for a variety of more specific reasons: to improve and increase the cultural exchange 
between countries or to help build personal relationships between heads of state 
(Swedish Royal Court, 2013). An explicitly stated aim of the state visit tradition is the 
promotion of bilateral trade (ibid.).  
The question I ask in this paper is: do state visits performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf 
help promote Swedish exports? 
 
I will be investigating the effect of state visits performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf on 
Swedish exports by estimating a gravity model fixed effects panel data specification 
of Swedish exports between the years 1973 (when King Carl XVI Gustaf became 
Sweden’s head of state) and 2006.  
 
As increased trade in general and exports in particular is normally linked to economic 
growth and higher levels of income, it is no surprise that a significant amount of 
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research has been dedicated to how increased levels of trade can be achieved. This 
thesis fits into a body of research that aims to investigate the effect of various export 
promotion measures and policies on international trade. However, while other areas of 
Swedish export promotion have been studied before, and while the effect of official 
and/or state visits on exports has been investigated for a handful of countries; no 
study looking at the effect on trade of state visits performed by Sweden’s head of state 
has, to my knowledge, been conducted. Neither is there, as far as I know, any studies 
that use the gravity model to investigate the effect of state visits on exports for any 
other monarchy.    
 
The rest of this paper will be structured as follows. The next chapter will give some 
background on the topics of Swedish exports, Swedish export promotion and state 
visits. Chapter 3 gives an overview of earlier research on the effect of various export 
promotion activities on actual exports. In chapter 4, the theoretical foundation, on 
which this thesis rests, will be discussed. Chapter 5 outlines the empirical 
specifications used in this paper and in chapter 6 the data is presented and discussed. 
The results from my estimations will be presented and analysed in chapter 7. The 
thesis is then concluded with some final thoughts in chapter 8.  
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2. Background  
 
This chapter will provide the reader with some background information regarding 
Swedish exports, Swedish export promotion and state visits. While exports (and thus 
also the promotion of exports through a variety of means) are regarded as important 
for a country’s prosperity and economic development for a number of different 
reasons, a high level of exporting is first and foremost regarded as vital as it allows 
for the possibility of importing goods from other countries – whether because these 
goods cannot be produced in the importing country or because they cannot be 
produced as efficiently there as they can be elsewhere. When production is focused on 
goods that the country has a comparative advantage in producing this will, according 
to theory, enable high levels of exports; through international trade a country can thus 
achieve a higher standard of living compared to if all consumed goods are produced 
in the country in question.     
 
2.1. Swedish Exports 
 
During the period 1973-2006 aggregate Swedish exports increased significantly as 
can be seen in figure 2.A. below. While Swedish exports during the period grew 
overall, figure 2.A. also show a couple of significant dips in exports: 1) in the early 
1990s following the Swedish banking crisis, and 2) in 2001 coinciding with the ‘dot-
com bubble’.  
   
 
Graph by the author, data from WTO’s “Time Series on International Trade” statistical database. 
0 20000 40000 
60000 80000 100000 
120000 140000 160000 
19
73
 
19
75
 
19
77
 
19
79
 
19
81
 
19
83
 
19
85
 
19
87
 
19
89
 
19
91
 
19
93
 
19
95
 
19
97
 
19
99
 
20
01
 
20
03
 
20
05
 
FIGURE 2.A. Total Swedish Exports 1973-2006 
Exports in US dollars at current prices (millions)  
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It is also important to note that while total Swedish exports grew significantly during 
the period the Swedish share of world exports decreased steadily. From a peak 
position in the early 1970s when Sweden’s share of global export of goods was at 2.1 
per cent it fell to 1.6 per cent in 1995 and 1.3 per cent in 2006 (though it should be 
noted that this decline in the share of global goods exports was to some extent 
compensated by an increase in Sweden’s share of exports of services)  (SOU 2008:90, 
p. 21). This downward trend in Sweden’s share of global exports reflects, primarily, 
the rapid growth and integration into the world economy of a number of 
developing/transitional economies (including China, India, Russia and Brazil) during 
the period of interest. While Sweden’s export market share decline was smaller than 
the EU15 average for the period it was still larger than, for instance, Germany’s and 
Austria’s (ibid., European Commission, 2012, p. 9).     
 
 2.2 Swedish Export Promotion Activities 
 
As noted in the introduction, market failure due to uncertainty and imperfect 
information is commonly used to justify official export promotion activities – Sweden 
is no exception. An analysis of how these types of market failures may be limiting 
Swedish exports points to three areas of particular concern: 1) The internationalisation 
of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), 2) Growth in remote and otherwise 
challenging markets, and 3) Growth in countries where open market competition is 
limited (SOU 2008:90, p. 230-231). Official export promotion activities in Sweden 
have during the time period at hand been aimed at improving export opportunities in 
response to a number of specific issues that firms face within these areas of concern. 
 
When it comes to SMEs, official export promotion efforts have targeted two specific 
issues. First of all, SMEs often lack knowledge about export markets regarding, for 
instance, customer preferences and demand levels, trade restrictions such as quotas 
and tariffs, as well as other types of regulations such as taxes and environmental 
regulation. Second of all, SMEs also tend to have low general export competency 
levels; when firms first begin to export they often lack knowledge, not only about the 
foreign market, but also about domestic Swedish rules and regulations for exporting 
as well as knowledge about marketing, organisation, distribution systems etc. (ibid., p. 
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231). Official export promotion targeted at SMEs work specifically with these two 
issues. 
 
Efforts aimed at promoting Swedish exports are, however, not limited to supporting 
SMEs. A number of official export promotion activities aim to help Swedish firms 
more broadly by, for instance, coordinating information about foreign markets 
through trade associations and forums, as well as through providing Swedish firms 
with financing including export credits and export credit guarantees aimed at 
mitigating the risk associated with investing in or exporting to certain markets (ibid., 
p. 231-232). Additionally, official export promotion activities include diplomatic 
activities/efforts to help open the door for Swedish firms and to introduce and 
facilitate contact between Swedish firms and contacts in the country in question.  
 
Official efforts to promote Swedish exports are thus diverse and, hence, naturally 
engage a large number of different actors. These actors’ roles are summarised in table 
2.A. below. 
TABLE 2.A. Official Swedish Trade and Investment Promotion Organisations/Agencies 
Organisation/Agency Organisational purpose 
Office for Project Exports Promote Project Exports. 
The Foreign Service Promote Sweden and Swedish export and 
investment opportunities. 
The Swedish Royal Court Promote Sweden and facilitate trade and investment 
opportunities. 
The Swedish Trade and Invest Council Export promotion. 
Invest Sweden Investment promotion. 
National Board of Trade Central authority for foreign trade and trade policy. 
The Swedish Export Credits 
Guarantee Board 
Financing and country risk analysis.  
Swedish Export Credit Corporation  Financing. 
Almi Financing for SMEs. 
Municipalities and County Councils Business promotion. 
Scientific and Technical Attachés  Advice and report on scientific and technological 
matters. 
County Administrative Boards Coordinate long-term business development work. 
Swedish Institute Promote interest and confidence in Sweden. 
Visit Sweden Promote tourism. 
Council for the Promotion of Sweden Facilitate dialogue and coordination promotion of 
Sweden’s image abroad. 
Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency 
Development cooperation and poverty reduction. 
Swedfund Provides risk capital for investment in emerging 
markets. 
Swentec Promote Swedish environmental technology. 
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(Adapted from SOU 2008:90, p. 254). Note that not all official trade/investment promotion 
activities are included here. 
 
As table 2.A. clearly shows, the Swedish Royal Court is only one organisation/entity 
among many that all purport to promote Sweden and Swedish trade and investment. 
The role and effectiveness of official export promotion is thus a broad topic and the 
role of most of these actors will not be discussed any further in this paper. The topic 
of interest here is official efforts aimed at opening doors for Swedish firms on foreign 
markets through diplomatic activities. Such trade promotion activities may include 
visits and delegations by politicians, the Royal Family and other public figures, as 
well as diplomatic efforts at the embassy and consulate level (ibid., p. 231). These 
diplomatic activities aim to promote exports by introducing and paving the way for 
Swedish firms and help them get access to persons and opportunities of interest; these 
efforts are generally regarded as particularly important when state actors have a large 
influence over the market in question, either because of the political situation in the 
country or because the nature of the good means that the state is either a buyer or in 
some other way directly involved (for instance, military and defence materials and 
infrastructure related goods and services) (ibid.).  
 
 2.3. State Visits 
 
State visits are the highest type of diplomatic contact between countries. Heads of 
state tend to travel extensively – a custom that seems to have increased in frequency 
over time. (Nitsch, 2007, p. 1797). While the blanket explanation for international 
travel by heads of state is to advance and improve bilateral relations, the actual aim of 
individual visits to foreign countries vary greatly (ibid.). Political relations, 
environmental and human rights issues as well as matters of cultural exchange are all 
frequent topics of discussion, however, one of the most discussed topics and the 
primary aim of most state visits is likely the furthering of economic relations, 
including matters concerning multilateral and bilateral trade (ibid.). It is common 
practice for heads of state to be travelling alongside a large ‘trade mission’ which 
tends to include both business managers, representatives from various export 
promotion agencies and commonly the minister/secretary of trade. 
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The role of heads of state on these visits also varies depending on the political power 
and position that he/she holds. As will be the discussed in the next chapter of this 
paper, prior research on the topic of the potential effect of state visits on bilateral 
trade has all been concerned with the effect of visits by heads of states in republics. 
This thesis is however a case study of Sweden. As a constitutional monarchy 
Sweden’s head of state King Carl XVI Gustaf’s role is purely ceremonial1 and state 
visits performed by him will thus likely be of a somewhat different character 
compared to state visits performed by, for instance, the president of a republic who 
may hold a significant amount of political power. I will discuss what this might mean 
for Sweden, in some more detail, in section 4.2. of this paper.  
 
King Carl XVI Gustaf has since he ascended the Swedish throne in 1973 performed, 
on average, two state visits a year (since their marriage in 1976 he has normally been 
joined by Queen Silvia on these visits). During the period 1973-2006, the King 
performed 71 state visits to 58 countries (see table A.1. in the Appendix). (Swedish 
Royal Court, 2013). The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for choosing the 
destination as well as for arranging the visit. The King is always accompanied by a 
delegation of 25 to 30 business representatives, selected and organised by the Swedish 
Trade and Invest Council, and normally by at least one member of the Swedish 
Government (ibid., Lindwall, 2013). As table A.1. reveals state visits seem to have 
been particularly focused on neighbouring countries and large trade partners, during 
this period.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
1 Prior to January 1, 1975 the Swedish king still held some direct political power. However, as the king 
did not, in practice, act on this political power and as only two state visits in my sample occurred prior 
to the implementation of the constitutional reform, I have not taken this into account in this study.    
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3. Earlier Research 
 
The so-called ‘gravity model of international trade’ has become a widely used model 
among trade economists in the study of international trade flows and volumes. The 
model has been used frequently to study the effect of both formal and informal 
barriers to trade and to investigate the vehicles behind high bilateral trade. Common 
areas of inquiry are, for instance, the effect of regional and/or free trade agreements 
on trade, of introducing particular tariffs and quotas, or of historical and cultural ties. 
Another topic that has been investigated using the gravity model of international trade 
is the effect, and thus also the effectiveness, of export promotion activities and 
agencies. As that is the focus of this thesis I will here, briefly discuss some previous 
studies concerned with this topic. In section 3.1. I will discuss a number of studies 
that have used the gravity model to investigate the effect of export promotional 
agencies and the foreign services on trade, while in the subsequent section I will 
discuss those studies that have investigated the area of export promotion that this 
paper concerns: the effect of state visits and trade missions on bilateral trade.  
 
 3.1. Export Promotion Agencies and Foreign Services 
 
Export promotion agencies have been considered essential trade policy instruments 
since the beginning of the last century and over time most countries have established 
a plethora of different organisations and agencies concerned with export promotion 
(the diverse Swedish efforts outlined in section 2.2. being in no way unique). Studies 
that aimed to investigate these organisations’ effectiveness were, nevertheless, for a 
long time unable to find evidence of such agencies actually being responsible for 
boosting trade (see for example Hogan et al. 1991, Gencturk and Kotabe, 2001). 
During the last decade a couple of studies have however been able to establish a link. 
A study by Lederman et al. surveys export promotional agencies in 88 countries and 
finds that these vary greatly along a number of dimensions such as institutional 
structure, responsibilities, strategies, resources and expenditures, as well as activities 
and functions (2010, p. 258). Using a cross-country regression they estimate that a 10 
per cent increase in export promotional agency budgets at the mean will lead to a 0.6-
1 per cent increase in exports. However, their findings suggest that agencies that have 
significant private sector representation on their executive boards but that also have 
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significant public sector funding are associated with significantly higher levels of 
exports compared to countries with fully privatised national export promotion 
agencies. Furthermore, they find that a large number of small agencies within a 
country (as the case is in Sweden) is a less effective way of promoting exports 
compared to having a single strong agency. (ibid., p. 264). Gil et al. also find an 
export promotion agency effect. The paper, which is a case study of Spain, finds that 
export promotion agency spending has a generally positive effect on Spanish exports, 
however, the authors also find that efforts by regional trade agencies seem to have a 
larger effect on trade compared to efforts at the national level (2008, p. 144).   
 
A few studies have also used the gravity model to study the effect of foreign services, 
such as embassies and consulates, on export levels and patterns. While a country’s 
foreign services have a number of responsibilities, various types of trade promotion 
activities certainly constitute a significant part of what they do. The previously 
mentioned case study of Spain’s export promotion activities by Gil et al. finds that 
Spain’s foreign services (i.e. the existence of a Spanish embassy or consulate in a 
country) have a significantly positive effect on bilateral trade (2008; p. 142). 
Additionally, the effect of foreign services on aggregate trade has been investigated in 
a cross-section study by Rose. In the study, which covers 22 exporters, the author 
estimates that embassies and consulates have a significantly positive effect on 
aggregate trade; the first foreign service mission in a country having a particularly 
large effect. (2007, p. 35). Another very interesting addition to the body of work on 
the trade promotion effect of foreign services is a cross-section study of 21 exporters 
by Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008). The authors’ focus is not (as previous 
studies) on the effect of foreign service missions on aggregate exports, instead they 
choose to investigate the potential effect on the extensive and intensive margin of 
trade, respectively. Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia’s findings suggest that while the 
foreign services have a significantly positive effect on the extensive margin of trade at 
country level, no such effect is found for the intensive margin of trade (2008, p. 24). 
In other words, embassies and consulates seem to be useful in the creation of new 
trade links but their export promotion activities seem to have no effect on increasing 
trade for already established trade partners.    
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 3.2. State Visits 
 
To my knowledge there are three studies that have used the gravity model of trade to 
investigate the effect that state or official visits have on trade flows/exports. The first 
study to do so was a study by Nitsch (2007), which examines the empirical 
connection between foreign visits by politicians (Heads of States for the United States 
and France, and Head of Government for Germany), and international trade flows. 
Considering the risk of reverse causality (as it is possible that any correlation is due to 
politicians choosing to visit countries that there has been an increase in exports to, 
rather than the other way around), Nitsch also runs a difference-in-difference 
specification on the data to ensure robust results. The second study at hand is a paper 
by Lee and Yeo (2009) that utilises the gravity model and a 27-year long panel data 
set to estimate the effect of official presidential visits on bilateral trade in the case of 
South Korea. A third and last study that uses the gravity model to investigate the 
effect of official visits on trade is a 2010 paper by Head and Ries that looks at the 
effect of Canadian trade missions (some of which were led by the country’s Prime 
Minister) on actual trade flows. The authors use a similar methodology to that used by 
Nitsch (2007) and Lee and Yeo (2009), but they include only trade missions, i.e. 
official visits specifically aimed at stimulating trade, in their data set.  
 
The findings from these three case studies, that use the gravity model of international 
trade to investigate the potential effect of state and/or official visits on trade flows, are 
not conclusive but seem to indicate that there might be an effect in some countries or 
for some heads of state/government. Nitsch finds that state/official visits are 
positively associated with exports; using a gravity equation to control for other known 
determinants of trade, Nitsch discovers that a visit from a head of state/government is 
correlated with 8-10 percent higher exports to the visited country. Furthermore, the 
results from the difference-in-difference specification indicate that state visits also 
have an effect on the growth of bilateral exports; however, it reveals that this effect is 
short-lived. (2007, p. 1815-1816) Lee and Yeo also find evidence supporting the 
theory that state visits positively affect bilateral trade relations. Their results indicate 
that official and state visits by Korean presidents are associated with increased 
bilateral trade between Korea and the visited country. The authors find some evidence 
indicating simultaneous causality, however, the positive effect of presidential visits on 
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bilateral trade is still present, at least in regards to Korean exports. (2009, p. 18). The 
results from the last study by Head and Ries do not, however, lend support to the 
common claim that state/official visits have a significantly positive effect on bilateral 
trade. The authors did find the Canadian trade missions were correlated with high 
levels of bilateral trade with the visited country when they used a gravity equation 
specification that did not control for unobserved bilateral effects (2010, p. 772). 
However, when they added lagged dependent variables to their specification this led 
to a much smaller estimated effect of trade missions. More importantly still, when 
including country-pair fixed effects in the regression (the specification preferred by 
the authors) no estimated effect of trade missions on trade flows were found. (ibid.) 
What these results indicate is that while bilateral trade between Canada and the visited 
country were indeed higher than trade with non-targeted countries, trade with the 
visited countries were also higher prior to the trade mission.   
 
A summary of the research papers discussed in this chapter can be found in table 3.A. 
below.  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TABLE 3.A. Earlier Research on the Effect of Export Promotional Activities on 
Bilateral Trade 
 Study Type of Export 
Promotion 
Method Data Findings 
Lederman 
et al. 
(2010) 
Export promotion 
agencies on the 
national level. 
Cross- 
section 
estimation 
88 exporting 
countries/ 
agencies for 
2000-2004 
average  
National export 
promotion agencies 
found to have positive 
effect on aggregate 
exports. 
Gil et al. 
(2008) 
Export promotion 
agencies on the 
regional level / 
The foreign 
services (Spain) 
Panel-data 
gravity 
estimation 
17 exporting 
regions/ 
agencies and 
188 trading 
partners for 
1995-2003 
Regional export 
promotion agencies and 
foreign services found to 
have positive effect on 
aggregate regional 
exports. 
Rose 
(2007) 
The foreign 
services 
Cross-
section 
gravity 
estimation 
22 exporting 
countries 
and 200 
trading 
partners for 
2002-2003 
The foreign services 
found to have positive 
effect on aggregate 
exports. 
Section 3.1 
Export 
Promotion 
Agencies 
and Foreign 
Services 
 
Segura-
Cayuela & 
Vilarrubia 
(2008) 
The foreign 
services 
Cross-
section two 
stage 
estimation 
22 exporting 
countries 
and 163 
trading 
partners for 
2002-2003 
The foreign services are 
found to have a positive 
effect at the extensive 
margin of trade at the 
country level. No effect 
found on intensive 
margin. 
Nitsch 
(2007) 
State and official 
visits by Head of 
State/Government 
(France, Germany 
and USA) 
Panel-data 
gravity 
estimation 
Three 
exporting 
countries 
1948-2003 
State and official visits 
found to have a positive 
effect on aggregate 
exports. 
Lee & Yeo 
(2009) 
State and official 
visits by Head of 
State (South 
Korea) 
Panel-data 
gravity 
estimation 
One 
exporting 
country 
1981-2007 
State and official visits 
found to have a positive 
effect on aggregate 
exports. 
Section 3.2. 
State Visits 
 
Head & 
Ries 
(2010) 
Official visits of 
trade mission 
character 
(Canada) 
Panel-data 
gravity 
estimation  
One 
exporting 
country 
1993-2003 
Official visits of trade 
mission character not 
found to have any effect 
on aggregate exports. 
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4. Theory 
 
The following chapter will examine the theoretical foundation on which this thesis’ 
empirical case study rests. In the first section I will discuss the development of the 
gravity model of trade and its theoretical underpinnings. In section 4.2. I then turn to 
an examination of the theory behind why and how state visits may reduce trade cost 
and influence trade patterns. 
 
 4.1. The Gravity Model 
 
Empirically speaking, in the absence of various policy related barriers to trade, 
bilateral trade flows have been found to be remarkably well explained by what has 
become known as the ‘gravity equation’. The concept was first introduced by 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963). The name is a play at Newton’s law of 
gravity – the greater the mass (economic size) and the smaller the distance between 
two countries, the greater the attraction (the more trade there will be) (Baier et al, 
2008, p. 466). The gravity model was found to be an excellent empirical fit and has 
for this reason been used extensively in the last few decades to evaluate the bilateral 
value of trade between countries. The model has, for instance, been used to infer the 
effect of economic unions and various trade and border barriers as well as for 
evaluating the effect of cultural and linguistic ties on trade flows (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003, p. 170).  
 
However, while it has been known that GDP and distance is related to trade flows 
empirically, originally the gravity model did not rest on any theoretical foundation. 
The lack of a solid theoretical foundation made the gravity model susceptible to two 
potential issues: (i) the estimated results could potentially be suffering from omitted 
variable bias, and (ii) without a theoretical foundation it was impossible to estimate a 
general-equilibrium gravity model which made comparative statistics exercises 
unfounded (ibid.).  
     
Anderson (1979) was the first to attempt to build a theoretical foundation for the 
gravity model. To do this, he utilised the Armington assumption, which differentiates 
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all goods by place of origin, and assumed that each country specialises in the 
production of one good. Furthermore, he assumed that preferences were identical 
across regions, homothetic and described well by the constant elasticity of 
substitution function. Under these assumptions it can be shown that when all products 
are traded national income is going to be equal to the value of the traded goods; since 
larger economies produce more goods these countries are also going to trade more. 
Furthermore, Anderson also started to solidify the theory surrounding costs of trade in 
the gravity model as he linked distance to transportation costs associated with 
international trade. Anderson’s paper thus contained the first gravity model that had 
some form of theoretical foundation (Greenway & Milner, 2002, p. 579). Other early 
work that aimed to give the model a more solid theoretical base was, for instance, a 
paper by Helpman and Krugman (1985) that discussed how the gravity model could 
be applied to a monopolistic competition situation with differentiated goods and 
increasing returns to scale. During this time period, the monopolistic competition case 
was also discussed by Bergstrand in a couple of papers (1985, 1989).  
 
Anderson and van Wincoop continued to develop the theoretical basis of the model in 
a more recent paper where they introduced and discussed the importance of equipping 
the equation with a ‘multilateral resistance’ variable (Anderson & van Wincoop, 
2003, p. 170). The primary idea introduced in the paper is that a central implication of 
a theoretically derived gravity equation is that trade between two countries does not 
merely depend on the absolute cost of bilateral trade between the two, it is also 
dependent on how the bilateral trade resistance (owing to any number of barriers to 
trade between the countries in question) compares to the average trade resistance 
between the countries at hand and all their prospective trading partners (ibid., p. 176-
179). Multilateral trade resistance could potentially be controlled for and introduced 
into the equation in a number of different ways – a common approach has been to add 
a so-called ‘remoteness variable’ to the model which takes into account the distance 
between the country in question and all other hypothetical trading partners. The 
problem with using remoteness as a multilateral resistance term is that it only takes 
into account multilateral resistance associated with distance, not trade costs incurred 
for other reasons (ibid., p.170). The approach that Anderson and van Wincoop instead 
suggest in their paper is that researchers should use price indices (functions of all 
bilateral trade barriers and income distributions) to capture ‘multilateral resistance’. 
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Expanding on the standard gravity model, Anderson and van Wincoop’s gravity 
equation becomes (ibid., p. 175): 
 
€ 
Xij =
YiYj
Yw
tij
PiPj
 
 
  
 
 
  
1−σ
                                                     
(1) 
where, 
 Xij = exports from country j to country i  
 Yi and Yj = GDP of i and j, respectively 
 Yw = world GDP  
 tij = bilateral trade costs between i and j  
  = the elasticity of substitution between all goods 
 Pi and Pj = price indices i.e. the multilateral resistance terms  
 
They argue that introducing their type of multilateral resistance variable makes it 
possible to consistently and efficiently estimate a gravity equation (ibid.). Variations 
of this approach have been widely employed since the publication of their paper and 
the introduction of the multilateral resistance term is regarded to have given the 
gravity model some of the theoretical rigor that it used to lack.  
 
 4.2. State Visits as Export Promotion 
 
An explicitly stated aim of state visits is, as already mentioned, to stimulate bilateral 
trade as well as to promote economic relations in general. Theoretically, state visits 
may function as export promoting activities in a number of ways. First of all, if a head 
of state holds political power he or she may use state visits directly to, for example, 
negotiate (free) trade agreements and treaties; this should theoretically allow for a 
significant positive effect of state visits on bilateral trade. This does not, however, 
mean that state visits performed by a head of state that lacks official political power 
(such as a king in a constitutional monarchy) will have no effect on trade. On the 
contrary, as mentioned earlier, it is commonly argued (though empirical support for 
this theory seems to be primarily anecdotal) that the presence of royalty on a trade 
mission is particularly beneficial for companies as it allows them to enter certain 
exclusive circles and make advantageous contacts. Theory points to two reasons why 
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a state visit performed by a royal head of state may have a particularly favourable 
effect on bilateral trade. Firstly, a royal visit generally tends to generate more public 
and media attention than a visit performed by a non-royal head of state. This, it is 
argued, allows small open economies with a royal head of state (such as Sweden) to 
‘punch above their weight’. (Ansink, 2013). Secondly, in countries where government 
plays a large direct role in the economy (largely countries with an autocratic or 
anocratic regime) a royal head of state may be more successful as a door opener 
compared to a democratically elected head of state. While the difference in political 
system between countries may be enormous, a visit by a royal head of state to another 
monarchy and/or non-democratic country will give an air of diplomatic equality 
between the countries. (ibid.). There is thus a theoretical foundation behind the 
common claim that state visits are export-promoting activities as they may reduce 
trade costs caused by information failures and other frictions. 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5. Empirical Specification 
 
In this paper I estimate a panel data specification of the gravity model of trade, which 
analyses the relationship between aggregate Swedish merchandise exports and one 
type of official Swedish export promotion. More specifically, this paper investigates 
the potential effect of state visits, performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf, on Swedish 
exports between the years 1973 (when King Carl XVI Gustaf became Sweden’s Head 
of State) and 2006. This chapter describes the method used and includes a description 
of the variables included in the gravity equation as well as a discussion of the 
regression specification as a whole.   
 
5.1. The Baseline Regression Specification 
 
My baseline econometric specification is a variation of a gravity model specification 
used to investigate state visits and international trade by Nitsch (2007, p. 1802). The 
dependent variable in the specification used here is an export variable that captures 
bilateral trade flows from Sweden to its various trade partners. The variable will be 
denoted Expijt, where i is bilateral exports from Sweden to the importing country j at a 
time period (year) t. (ibid.).  
 
As the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Swedish exports 
and state visits (as a form of export promoting activity), the independent variable of 
primary interest here is a variable called StateVisitijt. StateVisitijt is a binary variable; 
if King Carl XVI Gustaf has made a state visit to country j at the time t, the variable 
will take on the value 1 while it will otherwise take on the value 0.  
 
The right hand side of an empirical specification of the gravity model should 
naturally, as discussed in chapter four of this thesis, also include the standard gravity 
model variables that capture the economic mass of the trading partners as well as the 
physical distance between them. Economic mass is estimated here by taking the 
product of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the exporter i (Sweden) and the 
importer j at a time t (in current US dollars) and is denoted by Massijt =GDPitGDPjt. 
The variable that captures physical distance is denoted Distij, and is simply the 
geographical distance between the two countries’ capitals. (ibid.). 
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Furthermore, following Nitsch, the specification used here includes a number of 
control variables that are often found to affect bilateral trade patterns and have 
become standard additions to the gravity model. The included control variables are 
dummies meant to capture: (i) whether Sweden shares a common border with the 
importer (Adjacencyij), (ii) whether the importer is a landlocked country 
(Landlockedj), (iii) whether Sweden and the importer share a legal system (Legalij), 
(iv) whether the importer is a member of the World Trade Organisation or its 
predecessor GATT at a time t (WTOjt), and (v) whether Sweden and the importer have 
a free trade agreement in place at a time t (FTAijt). (ibid.). Nitsch’s specification 
(which looks at the effect of state visits for France, Germany and the United States) 
also includes three control variables that I have excluded from this study, as they do 
not apply to a study concerned with exports from Sweden. The variables in question 
are: a variable that captures current and former colonial linkages (excluded as Sweden 
has no colonial history), a variable that captures common language (excluded as only 
one other country, Finland, has Swedish as an official language), and a variable that 
captures shared currency (excluded as Sweden is not a member of any currency 
union).  
 
As discussed in chapter four, one of the perceived benefits of state visits is that 
royalty and (perhaps to a lesser degree) high ranking politicians and other official 
actors are thought to be able to help booster exports by introducing and paving the 
way for exporting firms and by helping them gain access to persons and opportunities 
of interest. As mentioned, this could theoretically be of particular importance in 
economies where state actors have a large influence over import decisions – that is, 
for the most part, autocratic countries and countries with considerable corruption. To 
try to capture this potential effect I include, in my specification, a dummy variable 
denoted Polityjt that takes on the value 1 if the importer j is an anocracy/autocracy at a 
time t, and takes on the value 0 otherwise (democracy), and an interaction variable of 
the form StateVisitijt*Polityjt. This interaction variable aims to capture whether or not 
the export promotion effect of a state visit is associated with the quality of an 
importing country’s governing institutions. The hypothesis is that state visits have a 
significantly larger effect on countries with governing institutions that are anocratic or 
autocratic, compared to countries that are regarded as democratic (as exporting firms 
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are presumed to be able to enter democratic markets more easily without the help of a 
state visit).  
 
The baseline regression specification, which I will also refer to as the ‘intuitive’ 
gravity model, is thus presented in equation (2) below. Since the gravity model 
discussed in chapter four is log-linear, the specification presented below has the 
natural logarithms of all continuous variables. 
 
€ 
LnExpijt =α + β1LnDistij + β2LnMassijt + β3Adjacencyij + β4Landlocked j + β5Legalij  
€ 
+β6WTOjt + β7FTAijt + β8Polity jt + γ1StateVisitijt + γ 2StateVisitijt *Polity jt + εijt         (2) 
where, 
€ 
α  is a constant and 
€ 
εijt  is a stochastic error. 
 
The coefficient 
€ 
γ1 for the binary StateVisitijt variable, is the parameter of primary 
interest; 
€ 
γ1 captures the extent to which exports from Sweden to countries, which 
have recently been visited by King Carl XVI Gustaf, diverges from the average 
sample value, holding other determinants of trade constant. (Nitsch, 2007, p. 1802).  
 
An increased distance between countries, an importing country being landlocked and 
an importing country being an anocracy/autocracy are expected to have a negative 
effect on exports from Sweden to the trading partner (the coefficients 
€ 
β1 , 
€ 
β4  and 
€ 
β8  
are expected to take on negative values). An increase in any of the other variables in 
the model is, however, expected to have a positive effect on Swedish exports to the 
country; all other coefficients in the model are thus expected to take on positive 
values.   
 
 5.2. Fixed Effects Regression Specification 
 
As discussed in chapter four of this paper, the addition of some type of multilateral 
resistance variable to a gravity equation specification is necessary in order to achieve 
efficiency and consistency. However, the multilateral price indices (Pi and Pj) that act 
as the multilateral resistance term in the theoretical gravity model are not observed in 
reality; a few different estimation techniques have been discussed and used to capture 
multilateral resistance instead. While it might seem that the most exact option would 
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be to use national price index data directly, this has never been done as such data is 
both lacking for many countries and, when available, is calculated using different 
methods in different countries. (Gómez Herrera and Baleix, 2013, p. 6). Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) do manage to obtain estimations of Pi and Pj for their data 
sample. Their method, which entails assuming symmetric trade costs, using a large 
number of goods market-equilibrium conditions and using a trade cost function 
defined in terms of observables, is, however, regarded as cumbersome and has 
therefore rarely been used by other authors (Gómez Herrera and Baleix, 2013, p. 6). 
Another more commonly used method for including multilateral resistance is to use a 
so-called ‘remoteness variable’ as a proxy. However, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a common critique of this method is that it only takes into account 
multilateral resistance associated with distance, not trade costs incurred for other 
reasons (ibid.).  
 
In this study I will instead use what has become the most commonly employed 
method: including fixed effects in the gravity equation as a way of controlling for the 
specific country multilateral resistance term rather than trying to estimate it (ibid.). 
The choice of fixed, rather than random, effects for my specification is based on 
intuitive reasoning but is also supported by econometrical evidence. While the 
random effects estimator is more efficient when it is consistent, it is unlikely to be 
appropriate for the model at hand as it implicitly assumes that any unobserved 
heterogeneous components are strictly exogenous. The fixed effect estimator on the 
other hand allows for heterogeneous components that are constant over time and 
affects each individual importer in a different way (Gómez Herrera, 2012, p. 4-5). 
Intuitively the existence of such heterogeneities seems like a possibility in my sample. 
A Hausman specification test confirms that the random effects model is inconsistent.  
 
A full set of year-specific fixed effects and a set of importing country-specific fixed 
effects are thus added to the specification and denoted by 
€ 
δt  and 
€ 
δ j , respectively. As 
the fixed effects regression specification includes an importing country fixed effect, 
this means that all time-invariant country specific variables included in equation (2) 
needs to be dropped in order to avoid multicollinearity (the dropped variables are 
Distij, Adjacencyij, Landlockedj, Legalij):  
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€ 
LnExpijt =α + β2LnMassijt + β6WTOjt + β7FTAijt + β8Polity jt + γ1StateVisitijt + γ 2OfficialVisitijt 
  
  
€ 
+γ 2StateVisitijt *Polity jt + δt + δ j + εijt                                                   (3) 
 
5.3. Reverse Causality and Delayed Effects  
 
It is of course a real possibility that any potential effect of state visits on country 
exports, that is found using specification (2) and (3), may actually be the result of 
reverse, or at least simultaneous, causality. It seems possible, maybe even likely, that 
more state visits are performed in countries to which Swedish exports are already 
disproportionately large prior to the visit. If this is indeed the case, then the estimate 
of γ may be upwardly biased. An effective way of establishing causality in this case 
would be to use an instrumental variable approach. However, to do so it is necessary 
to find an appropriate instrument that is highly correlated with StateVisitijt yet 
exogenous. In addition, a good instrument must take into account the panel structure 
of the dataset. I have been unable to identify such an instrument. To explore whether 
reverse/simultaneous causality might be an issue I will instead follow Nitsch (2007, p. 
1804-1805) and re-run the regression specification while including a set of dummy 
variables for the five years prior to when a state visit takes place. In other words, I 
will estimate separate γ’s for each of the variables StateVisitijt-5, StateVisitijt-4, 
StateVisitijt-3, StateVisitijt-2 and StateVisitijt-1. Additionally, I will for robustness 
purposes also re-run the regression and, instead of including separate binary lead 
variables for each individual year leading up to the visit, include a binary variable 
called Pre-StateVisitPeriodijt that estimates a coefficient for the entire five-year pre-
visit period. The decision to include separate and joint lead dummies for five years, 
specifically, is arbitrary but in line with previous research.  
 
It is also an obvious possibility that the effect of a state visit on exports may not 
always be apparent in that very year; i.e. if a contact is struck or a trade agreement 
entered into as a result of King Carl XVI Gustaf’s visit to a country, the resulting 
increase in trade may not occur that very year but rather in the years following the 
visit. I will therefore also estimate the coefficients for the lag variables StateVisitijt+1, 
StateVisitijt+2, StateVisitijt+3, StateVisitijt+4 and StateVisitijt+5. In addition to this I will 
also re-run the regression with a joint lag variable called Post-StateVisitPeriodijt that 
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includes the entire five-year post-visit period. Hence, when I re-run the regression 
specification as a robustness check, the included lead variables will capture if state 
visits are taking place where export levels are already high and increasing while the 
lag variables will capture if the effects of a state visit is delayed. 
 
I will also perform a second robustness check in regards to possible reverse or 
simultaneous causality. Following Nitsch (2007, p. 1807-1808), I will do this by 
specifying a long run difference-in-difference equation where annual growth rate of 
exports from Sweden to the importing country j (ExpGrowthijt) is regressed on a 
dummy variable (EverStateVisitij) that takes on the value 1 if the importing country j 
has received a state visit from Sweden at any point during the sample time period, and 
a dummy StateVisitijt that takes on the value 1 when an actual visit has occurred: 
 
  ExpGrowthijt = α + βEverStateVisitij + γStateVisitijt + δt + δj + εijt.   (4) 
where, like before, α is a constant, δt is a comprehensive set of time dummies, δj a set 
of importer dummies and εijt is a stochastic error. 
 
This difference-in-difference regression is a valuable robustness check for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, by looking at export growth rates rather than the export level any 
time-invariant factors that have an effect on export levels will be cancelled out. 
Secondly, systematic differences in growth in exports from Sweden to importing 
countries, which did receive a visit, and countries that did not receive a visit are 
controlled for by the EverStateVisitij dummy; in other words if the King tends to visit 
countries to which Swedish export growth is exceptionally strong, the variable should 
capture this. Lastly, by including a comprehensive set of time dummies in the 
regression it is possible to control for any common trends and/or period-specific 
shocks. (Nitsch, 2007, p. 1809). 
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6. Data 
 
In this section I will shortly discuss the data and data sources used for the empirical 
analysis in this paper. I will also comment on any data limitations. Summary statistics 
for the variables used in the paper can be found in table A.2. in the Appendix. 
 
 6.1. State Visits 
 
Information about state visits performed by Sweden’s head of state King Carl XVI 
Gustaf are available on the Swedish Royal Court’s webpage for the entire period of 
his reign. Information regarding the advertised and/or unadvertised purpose of the 
visits performed during the period is unfortunately unavailable. It is obviously the 
case that state visits may occur for a variety of official and unofficial reasons. While 
some visit may have been for the specific purpose of boosting exports to a country, 
other visits might have had small ambitions in that regard. It would certainly have 
been interesting to distinguish between different types of visits in order to investigate 
whether state visits where matters concerning trade relations are emphasised have a 
larger effect on bilateral exports compared to visits where these aspects are not 
highlighted. However, this paper is still relevant without such a differentiation 
between the visits as it does answer whether there is an overall or inherent effect of 
state visits, performed by the current King, on Swedish exports.  
 
Another potentially interesting addition to the analysis would have been to, for 
comparative purposes, include official visits performed by Swedish Prime Ministers 
in the analysis. A theoretically interesting exercise would then have been to include 
an interaction variable of state visits and official visits, as it would in that case have 
been possible to explore how visits by both the Prime Minister and by King Carl XVI 
Gustaf to a country in the same year affect exports, i.e. whether there is an additional 
effect associated with joint export promotion efforts. However, unfortunately neither 
the Government Offices’ Archive nor the National Archives keep complete records of 
official visits performed by Swedish Prime Ministers. 
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 6.2. Trade Flows    
 
Aggregate merchandise trade flow data for the time period is gathered from the UN 
COMTRADE database. I chose to use Swedish export data (rather than data reported 
by the importing countries) as it is more comprehensive and likely more reliable than 
the trade flow data reported by a majority of the importers in the sample. When trade 
is unrecorded or zero, I follow standard practice and ignore those entries (Nitsch, 
2007, p. 1802). This is, however, a minor issue as for most entries in my sample 
positive export values are reported.  
 
Another issue that has been discussed in the gravity literature is whether trade flow 
values ought to be in nominal or real terms in a time-series gravity model. The 
standard choice, which I have also chosen for this paper, is to use nominal trade flow 
data as exports are already deflated by the inclusion of a multilateral resistance terms 
(Sheperd, 2013, p.15). 
 
 6.3. Determinants of Trade   
 
As discussed in chapter 5, a variety of known determinants of trade are included as 
control variables in the gravity model used in this paper. I use the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations International’s (CEPII) gravity dataset for this 
purpose. It includes data on distance (bilateral geographical distances calculated using 
longitudal/latitudal locations of country capitals) and economic mass (GDP as 
reported by the World Bank Development Indicators). The dataset also includes data 
for the variables Adjacencyij, Landlockedj, Legalij, WTOjt and FTAijt. Data for the 
institutions variable Polityjt comes from Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV 
Project.  
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7. Results 
 
I will in this chapter discuss the empirical results from my gravity model investigation 
into the potential effect of state visits, performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf during the 
period 1973-2006, on Swedish exports. The results from the various regression 
specifications and the robustness checks discussed in chapter five will be presented 
and considered.  
 
Before turning to the presentation of the results of the gravity specifications, I will 
however start by briefly considering a correlation matrix for the variables included in 
this study’s gravity equation. The correlation matrix can be found in table A.3. in the 
Appendix. Firstly, by examining the correlation between the various independent 
variables, I conclude that no multicollinearity can be detected in the data. Secondly, 
examining the correlation between variables is also useful for understanding the 
relationships of the gravity model from an intuitive point of view (Shepard, 2013, p. 
10). Exports, LnExpijt, are here, as expected, positively correlated with economic mass 
and negatively correlated with distance. Furthermore, all standard control variables 
included in this gravity model have the expected signs in the correlation matrix and 
the included Polityjt variable, which takes on the value 1 if importer j is an 
anocracy/autocracy at a time t is negatively correlated with Swedish exports. The 
variables of interest, StateVisitijt and StateVisitijt*Polityjt, are both positively correlated 
with exports.  
 
7.1 The Baseline Regression Specifications 
 
I start by performing my baseline gravity regression specifications using the dataset. 
The pooled OLS regressions (1)-(3) presented in table 7.A. below are thus the 
estimates from an intuitive or conventional gravity model. For all regressions robust 
standard errors are used to avoid potential issues of heteroskedasticity in the data. The 
standard errors are also adjusted for clustering using the variable Distij; this is done to 
permit for clustering by country-pair as autocorrelation may otherwise be a problem 
when using the gravity model. (Shepard, 2013, p. 28-29).  
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As can be seen in the first column in table 7.A. the standard gravity framework seems 
to be able to explain Swedish exporting patterns well. In accordance with theory, 
export value tends to increase with economic mass (Massijt =GDPitGDPjt) and 
decrease with distance between Sweden and the importer. The control variables 
included in pooled OLS (1) are also mostly significant and have the expected signs: 
the importing country being land-locked has a negative effect on Swedish exports to 
the partner country while having a shared legal system or having a free trade 
agreement with Sweden in place leads to a rise in Swedish exports. Adjacency, 
importer membership in GATT/WTO and the country being an anocracy/autocracy all 
have a positive but statistically insignificant effect on Swedish exports. This standard 
intuitive gravity equation has a very high R2 (as is common with gravity equations 
that tend to have a very good empirical fit); it explains 80.6 per cent of variation in 
Swedish export flows. Furthermore pooled OLS (1) has a highly significant F-
statistic, which also underlines that the specification fits the data well.  
 
The next two columns of table 7.A. add the variables of interest to this study: 
StateVisitijt and the interaction variable StateVisitijt*Polityjt. The question is whether 
state visits performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf helps promote Swedish exports. The 
intuitive/conventional pooled OLS specifications (2) and (3) give some weak support 
of this theory. The estimated coefficient γ1 is positive and statistically significant at 
the 10 per cent level in pooled OLS specification (3); the estimate of 0.170 indicates 
that Swedish state visits tend to increase exports to the partner country by, on average, 
18.5 per cent (= exp[0.170] – 1), holding other variables constant. The coefficient for 
StateVisitijt is, however, statistically insignificant at the 10 per cent level in 
specification (2). The interaction variable StateVisitijt*Polityjt in specification (3) 
(which aims to capture whether the export promotion effect of a state visit is 
associated with the quality of an importing country’s governing institutions - that is 
whether state visits have a significantly larger effect on countries with governing 
institutions that are characterised as anocratic/autocratic governing institutions) is also 
statistically insignificant.    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TABLE 7.A. Pooled OLS Specifications 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
LnDistij -0.772*** 
(0.125) 
-0.771*** 
(0.125) 
-0.771*** 
(0.125) 
LnMassijt 0.894*** 
(0.025) 
0.893*** 
(0.025) 
0.893*** 
(0.025) 
Adjacencyij 0.244 
(0.169) 
0.241 
(0.166) 
0.240 
(0.165) 
Landlockedj -1.067*** 
(0.246) 
-1.067*** 
(0.246) 
-1.067*** 
(0.246) 
Legalij 1.181*** 
(0.212) 
1.177*** 
(0.210) 
1.177*** 
(0.211) 
WTOjt 0.042 
(0.148) 
0.042 
(0.148) 
0.042 
(0.148) 
FTAijt 0.516** 
(0.220) 
0.515** 
(0.212) 
0.515** 
(0.219) 
Polityjt 0.090 
(0.134) 
0.091 
(0.134) 
0.092 
(0.134) 
StateVisitijt  0.148 
(0.093) 
0.170* 
(0.094) 
StateVisitijt 
*Polityjt 
  -0.102 
(0.317) 
Constant 4.134*** 
(1.309) 
4.136*** 
(1.307) 
4.133*** 
(1.308) 
R-squared 0.806 0.806 0.806 
F-statistic 
(significance) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports LnExpijt. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote statistically robust at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
Standard errors adjusted for 191 clusters in Distij. Exporting nation is Sweden. Period 1973-2006. 
Number of observations = 5767. 
 
7.2. Fixed Effects Regression Specification 
 
For the next step I now extend the baseline regression specification to include a full 
set of year-specific fixed effects and a full set of importing country-specific fixed 
effects. As discussed earlier, this extension of the intuitive model makes it possible to 
consistently estimate the theoretical gravity model by controlling for the specific 
country multilateral resistance term rather than trying to estimate them (Gómez 
Herrera and Baleix, 2013, p. 6). If there are unobservable or other omitted variables 
affecting Swedish export patterns, the fixed effect method will deal with these. The 
method will provide a more consistent estimate of γ1 and γ2 as time-invariant 
  32 
variables are accounted for by design (Nitsch, 2007, p. 1804). The fixed effect 
regressions (1)-(3) are presented in table 7.B.  
 
A first significant difference from the baseline regression specification results is that 
the gravity model’s explanatory power has increased even further with the inclusion 
of year and importer fixed effects – the R2 now indicates that all three fixed effect 
specifications presented in table 7.B. explain over 92 per cent of variation in Swedish 
exports. This increase is obviously due to the large number of dummy variables that 
have been added to the regressions. A second noteworthy change from the earlier 
specifications is that the only variable (besides the majority of importer and year 
dummies) that is still statistically significant is economic mass. The variables of 
interest for this study, StateVisitijt and StateVisitijt*Polityjt,, are presented in fixed 
effect specifications (2) and (3). The StateVisitijt variable, which was found to be 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level in one of the pooled OLS 
specifications, is negative and insignificant when fixed effects are added to the gravity 
model. This indicates that there is no support for the theory that state visits, performed 
by King Carl XVI Gustaf, lead to increased Swedish exports to visited countries. The 
interaction variable StateVisitijt*Polityjt is also negative and statistically insignificant 
meaning that there seems to be no support for the theory that state visits by the King 
has an important door-opener function in countries characterised by anocratic or 
autocratic governing institutions. 
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TABLE 7.B. Fixed Effect Specifications 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
LnMassijt 0.761*** 
(0.133) 
0.761*** 
(0.133) 
0.763*** 
(0.134) 
FTAijt 0.135 
(0.108) 
0.135 
(0.108) 
0.135 
(0.108) 
Polityjt -0.028 
(0.114) 
-0.029 
(0.115) 
-0.029 
(0.114) 
StateVisitijt  -0.067 
(0.051) 
-0.015 
(0.055) 
StateVisitijt 
*Polityjt 
  -0.235 
(0.168) 
Constant -0.781 
(2.016) 
-0.781 
(2.017) 
-0.793 
(2.016) 
R-squared 0.924 0.924 0.924 
  
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports LnExpijt. Importer and year fixed effects included in all 
regressions but unreported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
robust at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. Standard errors adjusted for 191 
clusters in Distij. Exporting nation is Sweden. Period 1973-2006. Number of observations = 5767. 
 
7.3 Reverse Causality and Delayed Effects  
 
Next I explore potential time patterns in the data by including a set of lags and leads 
for five years prior to and five years following a state visit. This regression is, as 
before, run with a full set of year and importer fixed effects. As no statistically 
significant effect of state visits were found using the fixed effect gravity model, there 
is no reason to worry about or suspect reverse causality. Indeed the coefficients for 
the leads StateVisitijt-5, StateVisitijt-4, StateVisitijt-3, StateVisitijt-2 and StateVisitijt-1 as 
well as for the joint lead variable Pre-StateVisitPeriodijt (presented in specification (1) 
and (2) in table 7.C., respectively) are all statistically insignificant.  
 
Potentially more interesting, considering the results from the fixed effect 
specifications in section 7.2., is the possibility that there is a lagged effect of state 
visits on Swedish exports to the visited countries; in other words, that once a contact 
is struck or an export agreement is entered into (as a result of the visit), the resulting 
rise in exports does not occur immediately but rather in the years following the visit. 
However, as can be seen in fixed effects specification (1) and (2) in table 7.C. none of 
the coefficients from the lagged variables StateVisitijt+1, StateVisitijt+2, StateVisitijt+3, 
StateVisitijt+4 and StateVisitijt+5, or the coefficient for the joint lagged effect dummy 
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Post-StateVisitPeriodijt are statistically significant. There is thus no indication of a 
delayed effect of state visits on exports.   
TABLE 7.C. Reverse Causality and Delayed 
Effects Specifications (Fixed Effects) 
Variable (1) (2) 
LnMassijt 0.851*** 
(0.140) 
0.762*** 
(0.133) 
FTAijt 0.268** 
(0.125) 
0.133 
(0.107) 
Polityjt -0.063 
(0.088) 
-0.026 
(0.115) 
StateVisitijt-5 -0.058 
(0.080) 
 
StateVisitijt-4 -0.052 
(0.073) 
 
StateVisitijt-3 0.010 
(0.074) 
 
StateVisitijt-2 0.026 
(0.073) 
 
StateVisitijt-1 -0.040 
(0.081) 
 
StateVisitijt -0.052 
(0.088) 
-0.052 
(0.070) 
StateVisitijt+1 -0.025 
(0.106) 
 
StateVisitijt+2 -0.038 
(0.093) 
 
StateVisitijt+3 -0.031 
(0.092) 
 
StateVisitijt+4 0.036 
(0.061) 
 
StateVisitijt+5 0.013 
(0.055) 
 
Pre-StateVisitPeriodijt  0.040 
(0.050) 
Post-StateVisitPeriodijt  0.026 
(0.072) 
Constant -0.061 
(2.542) 
-0.794 
(2.017) 
R-squared 0.947 0.924 
No. of obs. 
(std. errors adjusted for x 
no. of clusters in Distij) 
3831  
(178)  
5767 
(191) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of exports LnExpijt. Importer and year fixed effects included in the 
regression but unreported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
robust at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. Exporting nation is Sweden. 
Period 1973-2006.  
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As an additional robustness check I now turn to the long run difference-in-difference 
equation (4) from section 5.3. where annual growth rate of exports from Sweden to 
the importing country is regressed on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
importer has had a state visit from Sweden at any point during the time period as well 
as on the ordinary state visit variable and the lagged state visit variables included in 
the earlier specifications. The results are presented in table 7.D. The first column 
shows the coefficient estimates when the treatment period is restricted to the year in 
which the visit took place while the remaining columns show results when the 
StateVisitijt variable is lagged. As the coefficient of the EverStateVisitij variable is 
statistically insignificant for all specifications, there is clearly no measurable 
difference in Swedish exports growth between countries which received a state visit at 
some point during the time period and importers that were never visited – indicating 
that reverse causality is not an issue. Furthermore, the coefficient for the StateVisitijt 
variable and the lagged state visit variables are also all statistically insignificant, 
implying that there was no discernable additional increase in Swedish exports growth 
to the visited countries at the time the visits occurred or in the years following the 
visit. 
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TABLE 7.D. Difference-in-Difference Specifications (Fixed Effects) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EverStateVisitij 0.043 
(0.573) 
0.024 
(0.574) 
0.057 
(0.573) 
0.031 
(0.508) 
0.025 
(0.431) 
-0.044 
(0.466) 
0.029 
(0.576) 
StateVisitijt -0.301 
(0.190) 
      
StateVisitijt+1  0.223 
(0.191) 
     
StateVisitijt+2   0.067 
(0.219) 
    
StateVisitijt+3    0.199 
(0.172) 
   
StateVisitijt+4     -0.043 
(0.175) 
  
StateVisitijt+5      -0.011 
(0.197) 
 
Post-
StateVisitPeriodijt 
      0.012 
(0.091) 
Constant -5.113*** 
(0.582) 
-5.105*** 
(0.582) 
1.138* 
(0.631) 
-6.314*** 
(0.603) 
-0.716 
(0.568) 
-0.199 
(0.438) 
-5.107*** 
(0.582) 
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.029 
No. of obs. 
(std. errors 
adjusted for x no. 
of clusters in Distij) 
5551 
(189) 
5551 
(189) 
5350 
(188) 
5159 
(188) 
4965 
(188) 
4774 
(188) 
5551 
(188) 
  
Notes: Dependent variable is annual growth rate of exports, ExpGrowthijt. Year fixed effects included 
in all regressions but unreported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
statistically robust at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. Exporting nation is 
Sweden. Period 1973-2006.  
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8. Conclusion and Final Thoughts  
 
King Carl XVI Gustaf performs, on average, two state visits a year and has done so 
since he became Sweden’s head of state in 1973. An often-stated objective of these 
state visits is the furthering of bilateral trade as well as the expansion of economic 
relations more generally. It is commonly claimed, by supporters of the monarchy, that 
a royal head of state is particularly effective when it comes to promoting exports. 
While there is some theoretical support for this idea, there are, as far as I am aware, 
no previous studies that investigate the effect of state visits on exports for Sweden or 
for any other monarchy. 
 
In this thesis, I have investigated the effectiveness of this one facet of Swedish export 
promotion. The question I have aimed to answer is whether state visits, performed by 
King Carl XVI Gustaf, help promote Swedish exports? This was done by estimating a 
gravity model panel data specification of Swedish exports for the time period 1973 to 
2006.  
 
The analysis reveals that when an intuitive specification of the gravity model is 
applied to the data, there is some support for the claim that state visits are helpful in 
promoting Swedish exports. However, when a full set of importer-specific and year-
specific fixed effects are included in the specification, in order to control for 
multilateral resistance, state visits are not found to have any effect on Swedish 
exports. I also included in my analysis an interaction variable that aimed to capture 
whether the export promotion effect of state visits is dependant on the quality of the 
importing country’s governing institutions. There is, however, nothing in the results 
that would indicate this to be the case. In other words, state visits do not seem to have 
a significantly larger effect on exports when the visited country is considered 
anocratic or autocratic. I have also performed a number of robustness checks. More 
specifically, a difference-in-difference specification was performed to detect potential 
reverse causality issues, and a comprehensive set of leads and lags were added to the 
fixed effects specification in order to investigate potential time patterns in the data. 
The analysis revealed no evidence of either reverse causality or any delayed effects of 
state visits on Swedish aggregate merchandise exports. 
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My results are less favourable to state visits as a form of export promotion than those 
of Nitsch (2007) and Lee and Yeo (2009), who find that state and/or official visits, in 
the case of France, Germany, the US and South Korea, contribute to bilateral trade to 
some extent. The results from the 2010 study by Head and Ries are, however, in line 
with the zero effect results found in this thesis. There are a number of reasons why 
results may differ between studies. One explanation could be small differences in 
methodology between studies; but it is also possible that the different results are due 
to the varying skill and/or political power of different heads of state, or a consequence 
of different countries having different export promotion strategies associated with 
their state visits. It is unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis to draw any 
conclusions in this regard. What can be said is that my analysis, of the effect of state 
visits performed by King Carl XVI Gustaf on Swedish merchandise exports, does not 
provide any reliable evidence supporting the common claim that these visits are 
effective in promoting bilateral trade.  
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Appendix: 
 
TABLE A.1. Swedish State Visits 
Year Date Visited 
Country 
Year Date Visited 
Country 
1974 8-10 October Norway 1992 7-9 April Ireland 
 19-21 November Finland  22-24 April Estonia 
1975 10-12 April Denmark  9-11 September Latvia 
 10-12 June Iceland  15-16 October Lithuania 
 8-10 July England 1993 27-29 April West 
Germany  
1976 25-28 October The 
Netherlands 
 7-9 June Norway 
1977 15-18 mars Belgium  22-24 September Poland 
1978 7-15 June Soviet Union  11-16 October India 
 11-15 September Yugoslavia 1994    
1979 20-27 March West 
Germany 
1995 16-18 May Czech 
Republic 
 6-9 November Austria 1996 12-15 March Malaysia 
1980 14-18 April Japan  28-30 August Finland 
 16-19 June France  2-5 December Chile 
1981 9-14 February Tanzania 1997 18-20 February South Africa 
 20-24 February Saudi Arabia 1998 3-6 November Mozambique 
 14-23 September China 1999 26-29 April Greece 
1982 17-23 January Mexico 2000 9–11 November Bulgaria 
 26 March - 6 
April 
Australia 2001 8–11 May Belgium 
1983 22-25 March Spain  8–11 November Russia 
 22-25 August Finland 2002 3–5 April Slovakia 
 21-23 September Luxemburg  5–7 November Mexico 
1984 2-7 April Brazil 2003 25 February – 
1 March 
Thailand 
1985     8–10 April Romania 
1986 29 September –  
5 October 
Portugal 
 
 26–28 August Finland 
1987 23-26 June Iceland 2004 2–6 February Vietnam 
1988 14-19 March Canada  7–9 February Brunei 
1989 13-16 February New Zeeland  15–17 June Slovenia 
 18-21 September Jordan  7–9 September Iceland 
1990    2005 17–19 January Thailand  
1991 8-10 April Italy  7–12 November Australia 
 2-4 May The Vatican 2006 30 May – 1 June Turkey 
 27-30 May Hungary  17–22 July China 
    24–27 October Canada 
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TABLE A.2. Summary Statistics 
Variable No of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min value Max value 
LnExpijt 5767 16.231 3.081 4.575 23.409 
LnDistij 5767 8.564 0.765 6.109 9.764 
LnMassijt 5767 20.931 2.566 13.379 29.257 
Adjacencyij 5767 0.012 0.113 0 1 
Land-lockedj 5767 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Legalij 5767 0.026 0.158 0 1 
WTOjt 5767 0.631 0.483 0 1 
FTAijt 5767 0.127 0.334 0 1 
Polityjt 5767 0.564 0.496 0 1 
StateVisitijt 5767 0.010 0.101 0 1 
StateVisitijt 
*Polityjt 
5767 0.002 0.047 0 1  
 
TABLE A.3. Correlation Matrix 
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it i
jt 
*P
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ity
jt 
LnExpijt 1.000           
LnDistij -0.512 1.000          
LnMassijt 0.856 -0.353 1.000         
Adjacencyij 0.207 -0.335 0.098 1.000        
Landlockedj -0.211 -0.043 -0.118 -0.051 1.000       
Legalij 0.247 -0.419 0.097 0.703 -0.072 1.000      
WTOjt 0.297 -0.109 0.335 0.087 -0.008 0.124 1.000     
FTAijt 0.511 -0.654 0.417 0.224 0.011 0.372 0.254 1.000    
Polityjt -0.272 0.164 -0.269 -0.130 0.154 -0.184 -0.256 -0.378 1.000   
StateVisitijt 0.113 -0.098 0.1011 0.079 -0.027 0.091 0.043 0.104 -0.072 1.000  
StateVisitijt 
*Polityjt 
0.031 0.0092 0.0405 -0.005 -0.021 -0.008 -0.009 -0.018 0.042 0.464 1.000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
